The recent thrust of Black and other minorities toward “community control” of local institutions—schools, hospitals, employment offices, and so forth—has been heralded by its allies as a radical step forward for the liberation of minorities. The purpose of this article is to place this thrust in its historical context and to challenge its advocates by offering another model of social change.

When we speak of institutions working for people, we mean schools teaching all the students who are supposed to learn in them, or hospitals and health institutions preventing or healing the diseases of all the patients who come to them, or urban renewal agencies providing low- and moderate-income housing for people without destroying neighborhoods as opposed to just dealing with the city’s tax base problems.

The list could go on. From the point of view of minority groups and low-income communities, the list can be extended to every major public and private institution in America. In most cases these institutions are serving someone other than the people whose needs they claim to meet. This someone else is usually a very well-organized interest group that has a stake in what the institution does. In the case of the schools it is generally the established bureaucracy that runs the system and the manpower needs of the economy. In the case of the urban renewal agencies it may be a combination of private financing and building interests and a city government looking for new sources of tax revenue. In the case of a police department it may be a very well-organized police force that effectively controls the department. The people who are supposed to be served become the victims rather than the clients or consumers, the inmates rather than the participants.

WHERE PEOPLE STAND
People who were supposed to be served have understood these failings for many years, and the ebb and flow of their struggles is one of the recurring themes of American history. The most recent development of the struggle was the civil rights movement of the 1960s, which sounded the call for a rebirth of organization and action by Americans excluded from the benefits and abundance of this society. Not since the great organizing drive of American labor in the 1930s did so many Americans begin to demand the right to shape their own future and to participate in the nation’s wealth.

But the great optimism of this movement has been shattered; the hopes of the period turned to pessimism. The War on Poverty turned out to be a minor skirmish, and maximum feasible participation to be petty patronage baronies in many neighborhoods, with local do-nothing “bosses” fighting with City Hall over the division of federal dollars. Frustration turned organizers bitter, led to the disappearance of some of the leading civil rights organizations, and turned many people away from politics and social action. Other leaders and organizers joined the system. Trading on past reputations, they became the “Uncle Talk Toughts” of business and government, forgetting the ghettos, barrios, hollers, deltas, and plains of poverty from whence they came in the comfort of their $18,000 a year jobs.

A smaller number of people from the “movement” began thinking about what had gone wrong and where they were going. They concluded that poverty and racism are not accidents in an otherwise flawless system. They now argue that poverty and racism were and are a basic part of the way the country is organized and that to change these conditions, we must change the way the country is organized.

Public institutions must be made responsible to the people they are supposed to serve. Their legislatively established purpose and the funds appropriated to meet this purpose must be sufficient to cope effectively with the problems for which the institution was nominally created. A classic example of failure in this regard is the huge system of state employment agencies unable to provide jobs for people who desperately want them and are looking for them.

Private corporations must be held accountable for their behavior. Corporations control more and more of the economic life of this country, and fewer and fewer corporations control more and more. These corporations, in turn, are controlled by a handful of Americans. Despite a mythology to the contrary, the
"Public institutions must be made responsible to the people they are supposed to serve."

rich of America are getting richer and control more today than they did thirty years ago. The private power of these corporations has penetrated so deeply into our political life that the two are often indistinguishable.

Each of the major political parties contains men who are conscious of what is wrong. And some of these men have been outspoken critics of the government policies of their own parties. But they have been powerless to bring about change in either their party or the government.

The national machinery of war, centered in the Pentagon, conducts much of the foreign affairs of the nation. Through its open intervention and its covert operations, American foreign policy supports the dictatorships and oligarchies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and, with the Greek junta, Western Europe.

Organized labor has lost much of its thrust as a dynamic progressive force. Although its legislative program on domestic issues still bears the stamp of New Deal liberalism, its leaders prefer to play it safe. No great drive to organize the unorganized has been launched. No great risk is taken to pursue labor's goal of full employment and a decent living standard for all. With the exception of labor's Committee on Political Education (COPE), and its voter efforts, no tremendous effort at membership education and social action in pursuit of labor's proclaimed goals takes place. Even on bread-and-butter issues, union leadership frequently lacks the militancy necessary to defend the members' rights on many work rule issues. As a result a large number of unresolved grievances exist in most major unions, and workers on the line are uncertain of their leaders' willingness to go to the mat on many of these issues.

At the same time union members are caught in the sequence of automation, foreign product competition, inflation, and unemployment, on the one hand, and the demands of excluded minorities and conservationists/ecologists, on the other. In the absence of a labor leadership with the vision that once characterized the CIO, the great hope of organized labor as the leading force in an alliance of ethnic and racial minorities and middle-class liberals is doomed to frustration.

The only major institutional source of support for the excluded and the powerless has been organized religion. But within the churches there is a growing reaction against the role played by ministers and church funds in efforts to organize the unorganized and to provide "witness" against the injustices of the society.

MOVING TO ORGANIZE COMMUNITIES

Having made this kind of analysis, organizers in low-income and minority neighborhoods (and their rural counterparts) have been going about the business of organizing so that excluded Americans can begin to have some power in determining their destinies. And more recently people in lower middle, middle, and even upper middle class communities have been doing the same thing. The latter's issues, of course, have been different: taxes, environment, zoning and planning, mass transit, and so forth.

Local people's organizations are springing up to begin the job of reordering the nation's priorities and reorganizing the country so that it can deal with the new priorities. These groups are demanding that institutions begin to serve the needs of the people. None of these organizations is yet so strong as to have made any lasting impact on the national scene. They are doing what they must first do: develop a base of power where the people are, around the immediate needs and interest of the people for whom they speak. No doubt these organizations will begin to link up regionally and nationally, but that is further down the road. What is needed now is a realistic strategy for operations at the local level, for the building of power. This strategy must include immediate, specific, realizable goals upon which action may be taken by people in the communities with the hope of some results. Such action is necessary to build an organization. At the same time the strategy must not preclude the linkages that might occur at a regional and national level around a broader vision and bigger issues. For example, an effective community action organization may make a dent in its neighborhood's unemployment problem by altering unemployment in the region so that the burden is placed on other neighborhoods or on suburbia. But a strategy for full employment of all who want to work cannot be achieved simply by local action. A major problem for organizations that develop power at a local level is to
avoid dead-end localism. This will require some vision on the part of their leaders, as well as an avoidance of the strategies that lead no place else.

THE DANGER OF WELFARE IDEALISM

The purpose of the rest of these notes is to outline a power-building strategy that begins at the local level. I would like to argue for the strategy of institutional change and specifically define it in distinction to a strategy of "community control." While the goals of each are close, the present arrangements of institutions in American life make community control impossible; rather, contrary to the intention of its advocates, it becomes a new form of welfare colonialism. In the context of present political realities community control means the substitution of local for outside administrators. The new administrators will run programs established by legislatures that are not responsive to the constituencies served. The legislation governing the so-called community-controlled agencies and the available appropriations will make it nearly impossible for them to even begin to meet whatever needs they are supposed to serve. A problem of political power precedes the question of how public institutions are administered at the local level. To operate otherwise is to assume that central legislative and policy bodies will somehow allow programs, projects, and methods of operation that they strongly oppose to exist in isolation. Put another way, administrative control cannot precede political power but does follow if power holders come from well-organized constituencies who are determined to see change take place.

Several examples should illustrate this point. Numerous public employment agencies or staff personnel, operating either out of state employment service offices or as directly funded federal projects, have sought to combat discrimination in employment by organizing direct action against employers with discriminatory practices. Through administrative reorganization, shifting of personnel, defunding, or other devices these agencies and personnel have been prevented from using their position in this way. What has happened is that the neighborhood offices of job programs, where they are not linked to independent political or organizational power, become the buffer between employees and the larger governmental units, and the neighborhood board must divide up a few jobs among the many unemployed. It is neither a job-creating agency (other than its own staff) nor an advocate for nondiscriminatory policies and affirmative action by private or public employers.

Community-controlled housing may provide enclaves of co-ops (or other moderate- or low-income housing) that solve the immediate housing problems of their residents. Seen as part of a broader strategy of turning urban renewal around to meet low- and moderate-income housing needs, making use of public housing where appropriate, organizing tenants in private housing for fair rents (using rent strikes and rent control legislation where appropriate and necessary), and developing state and national policies to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income people, the co-op becomes an important immediate benefit to the neighborhood in an overall organizational drive. More common, however, is the isolated co-op housing development, built on a site that used to house low-income people who can't afford the co-op housing. The co-op becomes an oasis in a ghetto desert; and, as a friend who lived in one described the constant vandalism from its neighbors, "You can't blame the desert nomads for raiding the oasis." The friend was Black; his statement was one of humorous explanation, not of racial judgment.

Neighborhood-controlled and funded organizations can and should encroach on the prerogatives of mainline agencies. This is especially true in dealing with self-disciplining and educational functions in the community. But this is not community control as that term is now used and understood. Basically community control involves the talents and energies of local leaders in the administration of externally defined programs, most of them created and financed by legislative bodies or private foundations. A community-control strategy absorbs local leadership and organizations in cutting up a pie that someone else has already baked. The size of the pie has been determined, as have most of its ingredients and the rules for cutting it up.

PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS

A strategy for institutional change retains organizational and political independence in a largely voluntary organization. The organization can and does make demands for a bigger pie, chooses its ingredients, and determines how it's going to be baked. The trick is to be able to make the institutions change their policies and practices without becoming responsible for their day-to-day operation. To do otherwise is to accept the responsibilities of government with none of its basic powers: legislation, taxation, appropriation of funds, and so forth.

The basic distinction is between politics and administration. People's organizations must become and remain political. Not in the sense of Democrat versus Republican, but in the sense that they wield power for a broad constituency and
are able to affect both public and private decision making. To do this such organizations must retain organizational and financial independence from government, corporation, and most foundation programs while at the same time shaping these programs to make them meet whatever needs of the people can be satisfied within the specific limits of the program.

The balance is a difficult one. Immediate benefits must be realized if people are to remain active. On the other hand, the capacity for extending the framework within which benefits can be realized at any time must always exist, or the organization will be entrapped in a dead-end street that ends before the problems of the people are solved.

Applied to specific institutions, this strategy gives a community organization the leverage to demand changes, the right to be involved in monitoring the implementation of these changes, and the freedom to demand further changes as these are needed by the community. Included are the full range of decisions made by the institution. But the perspective is not that of one running the institution, but of one demanding that it be run better and more consistently to meet the needs of the people it is supposed to serve. The demand is that those who run the institution straighten it up.

The strategy of the people's organization may be to seek recognition for itself as the monitor of an institution's performance. The slogan used in the neighborhood may even appear more conservative than "community control," it may be "citizen participation" or "community-agency partnership." To choose community control would be to assume all the inadequacies of the institution. Critics will now be able to say, "Well, you're running it now, and what have you been able to do?" The problems are the same for the community-controlled institution as for its predecessor; the major difference is that there are new administrators for the people to blame for the institution's inadequacies.

**MODEL CITIES**

A good application of this distinction between institutional change and community control is to be found in the current struggles over the Model Cities program. Democratic party strategy was to give "control" to communities. But how does a "community-controlled" Model Cities program deal with housing problems when government policy makes it almost impossible to provide low-cost housing at a rate sufficient simply to keep up with the destruction of low-cost units that results from highway construction, code enforcement, urban renewal and other governmental activity. This is not even to mention the general loss of low-cost units owing to the activity of the private market. How does community-controlled Model Cities, with no real housing money, make a dent? And if it doesn't make a dent, but is constrained from fighting for new legislation, better policies, and against slumlords and private sector activity that eliminates low-cost units, what is to prevent the community-controlled Model Cities agency from becoming the enemy in the neighborhood—as "down-town" was previously?

Republican party strategy calls for Model Cities to be a program of the mayor and the mainline social agencies (public and private). Whatever its purpose, this strategy can provide a great service to low-income and minority communities. By making Model Cities an official program of the city government, the community's political focus must remain on the mayor and city hall. At the same time citizen participation requirements provide the mechanism for a well-organized community to have a continual impact on what city hall is doing. As a matter of fact, almost every one of the new Republican guidelines for the Model Cities "planning process" can be used by a well-organized community to meet its own ends. These guidelines can set the stage for alliances between community organizations and mayors against recalcitrant city bureaucracies. The community organization, representing the day-to-day experiences of its people with a city agency and the power of an organized community, can join with the mayor, who has powers over the budget, appointment of governing boards, mobilization of citywide public opinion, and so forth, to really shape up an agency. At the same time this alliance can demand more funds for the cities and can use the Model Cities planning process as a vehicle for the distribution of those funds between "cooperative" and "uncooperative" agencies.

It is indeed ironic that the Republicans should be the ones seeking to strengthen the role of mayors, most of whom are Democrats—at least in the cities where large Model Cities grants are directed. On reconsideration the irony becomes even greater. Liberal Democrats, attempting to respond to community demands and seeking to wrest minority voting blocs from big-city mayors, could fit their model cities guidelines into the current language of community control. More conservative Republicans, attempting to make the formal structures work as well as placing political responsibility for the problems of federal programs with the mayors, come up with guidelines that appear to take power away from the community. But these guidelines must be carefully examined: they demand (1) that Model Cities be a city program; (2) that the director of a Model Cities program have "clear and direct access" to the chief executive of the city; and (3) that the "citizen participation mechanism" have a clear role in setting priorities, stating neighborhood strategies for change, and establishing citizen mechanisms for
the monitoring and evaluation of program performance. And the "Feds" are willing to allow a mayor and city government the right to recognize a neighborhood group to the extent that no plan will be submitted for federal funding without the consent of the neighborhood citizen participation mechanism. The fight is taken to the local level. If the neighborhood is well organized, it can win. Furthermore, HUD insists that programs be administered through "mainline" agencies unless it is demonstrated that they are incapable of doing the required job, after good faith negotiations on the part of the city government or the residents. The operation of the city government or the residents. Therefore becomes incumbent upon the city and the residents to organize sufficient power to change large-scale bureaucracies rather than to establish "pilot projects" that prove that the best people with a lot of money can do better than the establishment. In fact the neighborhood organization is in a position to demand this kind of approach from the city government when the latter becomes reluctant to act.

To illustrate the point: In one Model Cities program where day-care centers were being established, different health, building, and fire inspectors were raising different (and contradictory) objections to the sites being considered for the centers. The Office of the Mayor, acting through the Model Cities agency, was pressed by the neighborhood to enter the situation—after all, the program is as much the mayor's as the people's—and make these agencies get together, cooperate with the child-care effort, and give a coherent picture of what was required of the center sites. This was done, and a new relationship emerged between the health, building, and fire inspectors and the child-care planners. The central point is that the self-interest of the mayor's office was as much involved in the success of the program as the self-interest of the neighborhood organization. Mayors and other locally elected officials are much more responsive to organized pressure than full-time city bureaucrats or federal officials.

**KEEPING AN EYE ON THE BROAD OBJECTIVE**

The most critical aspect of the strategy for institutional change is the capacity of the people's organization to redirect an institution without, in the process, losing its own direction and becoming absorbed in the procedures and processes of the particular institution. Yet the latter is exactly what happens when organizers and local organizations become the policy board or staff of an agency or institution in their neighborhood. And it is precisely such pyrrhic victories that dot the map of poverty neighborhoods across the country. The shift is from protest to administration, with no political power developed in between. Having "won" the issue at stake in the protest, the local organization becomes absorbed in the administration of a new Head Start program, health center, skills center, or whatever was at stake in the battle. And six months later, when another important issue arises in the neighborhood, there is no organization to respond to it, let alone to take initiatives above and beyond the politics of protest and crisis.

Organizationally speaking, each specific programmatic victory must be used as a tactic in the pursuit of broader goals that are more difficult to attain. So that a new service, program, or institution doesn't get out of hand and become a specific rival in the community, the people's organization may want to be granted specific functions in the monitoring and evaluation of whatever program is the outcome of a specific victory. But this role is performed from outside the institution through the structure of the people's organization. It may be coupled, as will be discussed later, with a strategy of organizing the employees at the institution or of relating to an existing organization of employees. Organizing the employees is part of what might be called a strategy of control from below. It is based on the notion that mass organizations, in the community or at the workplace, provide a vehicle through which people exercise the most control over their lives. These vehicles provide the political machinery for further demands on the system and qualitative changes in the nature of the overall system as these are required for the full realization of democratic values.

The approach of work through the community organization has the following key elements: (1) the people of the community learn that through organization they can bring about change; (2) the people's organization is recognized as the legitimate voice of the community; (3) the people's organization is strengthened in its victories, retaining its independence and capacity to deal with other problems and issues rather than becoming absorbed in administering programs. Instead of being swallowed up in victory, the appetite of the people and their organization grows. Justice tastes good, and more is demanded. The people's demands increase with victory and the realization that a better life is possible.

Within those arenas in which victory...
"... citizen participation requirements provide the mechanism for a well-organized community to have a continual impact on what City Hall is doing."

has been achieved, the best possible operation of the programs is sought—within the external political limits placed upon them. The struggle to extend political limits is the struggle of the people's organization, not of the staff and administrators of new, modified, or improved programs. Because patronage is not its primary goal, nor the primary force holding it together, the people's organization is free to seek the best professionals to administer the programs. As a matter of fact, it demands this—and the freedom for the professionals to do a good job. At the same time paraprofessional programs within the agency, with full career ladders for neighborhood residents, are a basic demand in all the institutions operating in the community. The organization similarly seeks democratic unionism for newly hired paraprofessionals so that they may become an effective voice within the administration of the program, protecting their job rights, adding their particular sensitivities as residents of the neighborhood to its operations, and so they may become an organized part of the people's coalition in its broader activities.

Black political organizations in "Black belt" countries of the Deep South operate on a year-round independent political basis. At the same time they are learning how to use federal programs to their own advantage, bringing desperately needed new resources into the counties but remaining independent of their day-to-day operation. Lowndes County, Alabama, is one example of the struggle to learn this lesson.

CONTINUOUS ORGANIZATION
To operate in the game of institutional change, the people's organization must constantly have its army on the alert. That army is the organized people of the community who are prepared to engage in mass action that might involve thousands of people and that provides the basic means for bringing about the kinds of changes we are discussing. In effect, the people's organization becomes a year-round independent political action group at the neighborhood level. Its targets of action are the top policy makers of whatever institution it is dealing with, whether public or private. These policy makers may be mayors, city councilmen, corporate directors, or public commissioners. They must be held responsible for policy. Their staff will serve as a buffer between them and the public. The first objective of any strategy of institutional change is to force a meeting with the decision makers. Once the decision makers are meeting with the people's organization, the first hurdle has been jumped; the struggle for recognition has been won. The meetings that follow represent the negotiations between equals of a mutually acceptable agreement. The relationship that emerges might be one of cooperation or of continual conflict. In either case it maintains the possibility of an adversary relationship. The institutions' policy makers operate in a different political environment from that of the people's organization. The people's organization is only one of the forces within management's political system. Rival groups, funding sources, conservative professional associations or employee organizations, marketplace pressures, and other interests also impinge on these policy makers. The relationship between the policy makers and the people's organization might best be described as a constant struggle over what constitutes "management prerogatives," with the administrators seeking to keep within their control as many decision-making prerogatives as possible so they may best respond, from their point of view, to the pressures brought to bear upon them.

Within the structure of the institution itself the people's organization may find allies. Except in the most repressive kinds of situations, the demand for change from the outside will strengthen the hands of those who are working for internal change. The release of the energies and creative talents of the best staff members within an institution is one of the consequences of effective external demands being placed upon it. Specific alliances with internal forces working for change in the institution may emerge in any given relationship between the community organization and the group with which it is dealing. The community organization's use of elected politicians increases the pressures for change. In precisely these situations top administrators either institute reforms themselves or are removed from office.

The employees of public institutions are generally blamed by their managers and policy directors for the problems of the institution. Thus teachers, nurses, recreation workers, policemen, bus drivers, orderlies, social workers, and so forth are routinely held responsible for the basic failures of the institutions within which they work. Probation workers are blamed for the faults of juvenile delinquency prevention work and rehabilitation efforts, social workers for the welfare system, and so forth. Whether, and to what extent, this is true must be examined in each case. And even if true, the people's organization must ask itself the strategic question whether the employees are an
"... each specific programmatic victory must be used as a tactic in the pursuit of broader goals that are more difficult to attain."

appropriate strategy for action. Management's strategy in these situations is to play the "consumers" of a service against the employees who provide the service. Since the consumers' direct experience is usually with the lowest level employees who provide the service. Since the consumers' direct experience is usually with the lowest level employees—the workers in the "frontline" positions—management's strategy frequently succeeds. The consumers' direct experience verifies in his mind the adequacy of public services, public officials, the strikers were Black, employees—the workers in the hospitals—would emerge; in some cases they would be harsh and difficult to resolve. But they can be settled if the people's organization desires to meet its own needs while recognizing the legitimate needs and aspirations of those who work within the institution. This may require actual bargaining between the parties. Such bargaining should take place independently of negotiations between the community organization and the institution's directors and policy makers. In many cases the possibility for a joint approach between the workers and the consumers will emerge.

Another reason for such an approach is simply a pragmatic power consideration. An attack on the employees locks them into the hands of management as the defender of the employees against "irresponsible community elements." When so attacked the employees will look to management as their protector. Or, if their own demands have placed them in a struggle with management, these demands are likely to be of the narrowest bread-and-butter variety. The basic strategy suggested here is to seek alliances with, or at least neutrality from, the employer, and social worker versus complicating such a strategy in relation to a number of recent teacher, hospital worker, and social worker versus community battles should be clear. Don't let the managers divide the community (consumers) from the workers in the institution.

SUMMING UP
What, then, would a successful strategy of institutional change look like? First, the people's organization is recognized by policy makers as the voice of the community with which they must deal. The program of the people's organization is adopted, in whole or part, through negotiations between the organization and the institution's policy makers. Specific roles for the people's organization in the monitoring and evaluation of institutional operations from the point of view of their consumers are defined. This may take the form of a contractual relationship in which the people's organization performs specific functions. For example, it might operate a grievance desk for patients at a hospital, manning it on a 24-hour basis and providing the patients with an independent on-the-scene source of support when something goes wrong. Further, the organization might participate in staff training and orientation. Other examples will suggest themselves to the leaders and organizers in the communities.

Second, the people's organization may itself begin to deal with external political limitations imposed upon the institution it has been dealing with. It may pressure a legislative body or funding source. It may deal with a professional association or other body that has been a real barrier to efforts by policy makers of an institution to bring about change. In some public and private institutions decision makers will recognize that this type of people's organization offers them a new ally in the struggle with legislatures or pressure groups that prevent the institution from fulfilling its purpose.

Third, within the institution itself reorganization and retraining of personnel take place to insure that the changes in policy become part of the institution's day-to-day practices. Personnel within the institution can take increased pride in their work. These changes generate a new life and sense of purpose in the insti-
A sense of mission or purpose that taps the best in people begins to overcome the frustration and negativism that might have existed before.

Fourth, through the mechanism of the people's organization, probably something like a first come, first served hiring hall or job waiting list, new paraprofessional slots, with career advancement ladders, are filled in the institution. And at higher levels personnel sharing the racial or ethnic background of the community are recruited.

Fifth, the people's organization learns through its experience and the evaluation of that experience the limits of reform at the level of a given specific institution. From this follows a concrete understanding of the necessity of broader political changes if community needs are to be met. If, for example, it is clear that doctors are not trained in preventive medicine, then the focus of attention becomes medical schools and the professional associations that heavily influence curriculum. Similarly teacher colleges become a focus of attention when it is realized that there is almost no preparation there for work in minority and urban schools. Teacher ignorance of minority history, it is discovered, is not only due (or even primarily due) to lack of teacher interest. It is structured into teacher training at the college level.

The strategy of institutional change is basically one of political action. Its basic premise is that changes more fundamental than the personnel running the institutions must be brought about if the country is to begin to meet the promise of liberty and equality for all. Prior to the now called for "reordering of priorities" in America, there must be a reorganizing and reordering of power relationships in the country. Such reorganizing will occur around the demand for reordering priorities on the national level, but it will most effectively occur when the first steps are taken at the local level and victories for people's organizations are won here. Other approaches are likely either to end in defeat or to provide a cloak for moral pessimism and withdrawal from public life. A reordering of priorities without a reorganization of power is a contradiction. It will become empty rhetoric until powerful people's organizations turn this slogan into specific action programs beginning at the local levels and linking regionally and nationally as the opportunities to do so arise.

BLACK STUDENTS AT WHITE COLLEGES. Charles V. Wilkie and Arline Sakuma McCord. Explores the black experience in social life, housing, curriculum development, and student-teacher relationships at four campuses of different types. Sept., 1972, 136 pp., tables, $10.00.


MANPOWER SUBSTITUTION IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: A Study of New York City Voluntary and Municipal Hospital Systems. Myron D. Fottler. Investigates the degree to which different types of labor are complementary or substitutable in hospitals, and the implications for the costs and quality of hospital services. Oct., 1972, 192 pp., tables, figures, appendix, bibliog., $15.00.
